US officials kept around 100 deported Indian migrants in shackles for their 40-hour flight home, including during bathroom breaks, in the latest incident to spark anger overseas at President Donald Trump’s migration crackdown.

Indian lawmakers demonstrated outside parliament on Thursday, some wearing shackles and others mocking the much-touted friendship between Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

Elsewhere in New Delhi, members of the youth wing of India’s main opposition party burned an effigy of Trump.

Last month, the spectacle of Colombian deportees being shackled as they boarded a US deportation flight sparked a bitter dispute between the two countries, with Colombian president Gustavo Petro initially refusing the military plane permission to land.

The anger in India comes days ahead of an expected visit by Modi to meet Trump – whom he has called a “true friend” – at the White House.

S. Kuldeep Singh Dhaliwal, a government minister in the western state of Punjab, where the deportation flight landed, urged Modi to “now use his friendship to resolve the issue.”

Dhaliwal also questioned “the usefulness of this friendship if it cannot help Indian citizens in need,” his office said in a statement.

The flight to India was the longest in distance since the Trump administration began deploying military aircraft for migrant deportations, according to a US official.

“Our hands were cuffed and ankles tied with chains before we took the flight,” said 23-year-old Akashdeep Singh, who arrived in Punjab on Wednesday with 103 other deportees.

“We requested the military officials to take it off to eat or go to the bathroom but they treated us horribly and without any regard whatsoever,” Singh added.

“The way they looked at us, I’ll never forget it… We went to the bathroom with the shackles on. Right before landing, they removed (the shackles) for the women. We saw it. For us, they were removed after we landed by the local police officials.”

US Border Patrol Chief Michael W. Banks posted a video of the Indian deportees being put onto a plane on X. In the video, shackles are seen on the wrists and ankles of several men who shuffle slowly up the ramp.

‘Better life, better future’

Deportee Sukhpal Singh, 35, also said the shackles were kept on throughout the flight, including during a refueling stopover on the Pacific island of Guam.

“They treated us like criminals,” he said. “If we would try to stand because our legs were swelling due to the handcuffs they would yell at us to sit down.”

Young Indians looking for work opportunities have made up a sizeable portion of undocumented migrants in the US, many after making the dangerous trek through Latin America to reach the US southern border.

Many say they see no future at home where a jobs crisis is stifling young hopes in the world’s most populous country.

In just four years, the number of Indian citizens entering the US illegally has surged dramatically — from 8,027 in the 2018-19 fiscal year to 96,917 during 2022-23, government data showed.

“I had gone for work, for better life, for a better future,” said Sukhpal Singh, who has a son and daughter and hoped to better provide for them by getting a job in the US.

“You see it in movies and you hear from people around you that there’s work there and people are successful there so that’s why I also wanted to go.”

Donald Trump has begun his second term as president by ramping up pressure on Panama – threatening to “take back” the Panama Canal and accusing the country of ceding control of the critical waterway to a US rival: China.

“Above all, China is operating the Panama Canal. And we didn’t give it to China. We gave it to Panama, and we’re taking it back,” Trump claimed in his inaugural speech last month.

There’s no evidence that China controls the canal, which is run by an independent authority appointed by Panama’s government. Beijing has repeatedly denied that it has interfered in canal operations.

But the US concern comes as the Trump White House seeks to shore up national security, especially in its own neighborhood, and win an economic competition with China.

At the heart of Trump’s contentions are a Hong Kong-based company that operates two key ports at either end of the 50-mile long waterway – and broader concerns about Beijing’s expanding influence in a region of the world where the US has long been the dominant power.

Panama’s President José Raúl Mulino has said Panama’s sovereignty over the canal was not up for debate, but the country has made other concessions to US pressure.

Following a meeting with top US diplomat Marco Rubio last Sunday, Mulino said Panama would exit China’s Belt and Road infrastructure drive – a blow for Beijing, which had celebrated Panama as the first country in Latin America to join the program.

Panamanian officials last month also launched an audit of the Hong Kong-owned firm that operates two ports at either end the canal.

Chinese companies have become increasingly caught in the crosshairs of Washington’s national security concerns. Chinese-owned app TikTok and telecoms giant Huawei have been among private firms facing intense scrutiny in Washington over concerns that they are ultimately beholden to Beijing, despite their denials.

Here’s what to know about China’s involvement in the strategic channel.

Does China have a presence in the Panama Canal?

The Trump administration’s key concern is found at either end of the waterway, where two of the five ports that service the canal are operated by Panama Ports Company (PPC), part of a port operator owned by Hong Kong-based conglomerate CK Hutchison Holdings.

Based in a gleaming skyscraper in downtown Hong Kong, CK Hutchison is a publicly listed company and one of the world’s largest port operators, overseeing 53 ports in 24 countries, according to the company. It was first granted the concession over the two Panama Canal ports in 1997 when Panama and the US jointly administered the canal. That concession was renewed in 2021 for another 25 years.

Rubio ahead of his visit to Panama said Hong Kong-based companies “having control over the entry and exit points” of the canal is “completely unacceptable.”

Hong Kong, which came under Chinese control in 1997, is meant to have a high level of autonomy from mainland China, but Beijing has dramatically tightened its grip on the city in recent years following widespread pro-democracy protests.

“If there’s a conflict and China tells them, do everything you can to obstruct the canal so that the US can’t engage in trade and commerce, so that the US military and naval fleet cannot get to the Indo-Pacific fast enough, they would have to do it,” Rubio said in an interview with journalist Megyn Kelly, without directly naming the company.

The Hong Kong-owned operator PPC, however, does not control access to the Panama Canal.

The Hutchison ports are not the only China-linked firms involved in canal infrastructure.

A consortium comprised of state-backed China Harbour Engineering Company and China Communications Construction Company was awarded the contract to build a $1.4 billion highway bridge over the canal to ease traffic in Panama City.

Meanwhile, state-owned COSCO Shipping is a major canal client, with nearly 300 of its cargo ships navigating the waterway each year, including container ships, dry bulk carriers, and oil tankers, according to company data from 2018.

Does that give China ‘control’ over the canal?

There’s no evidence that the Chinese government controls the canal or of Chinese military activity in Panama, experts say.

But US officials’ concerns come amid a global scrutiny of Beijing’s efforts to build or secure access to commercial ports around the world – which could also benefit China’s expanding navy.

When it comes to the Panama Canal, some observers say that Chinese firms’ involvement in the canal and its infrastructure could give Beijing leverage – both in terms of commercial advantage and in the event of a potential future conflict with the US.

Rubio referenced this concern during a confirmation hearing for his post in January, saying that a “foreign power” possesses the ability, through their companies, “to turn the canal into a choke point in a moment of conflict.”

The strategic risk from a military perspective is that the more commercial assets that are linked to China around the canal, the more options Beijing has to block the US from moving military equipment through the waterway in the event of a conflict between them, according to R. Evan Ellis, a research professor of Latin American Studies at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute.

“All of these operations, and the relationships with Panama Canal Authority … plus the technical knowledge that you get as a regular operator of the canal basically multiplies the possibilities that if you are (China) and you want to shut down the canal at a time of conflict, there are a thousand ways to do it,” he said, pointing to actions like attacking lock control systems or physically blocking the waterway. “Their physical presence, influence and technical knowledge … would make it harder for us to defend against.”

Federal Maritime Commission Chairman Louis Sola last week told Congress the US must also guard against “any effort by other interests in Panama to diminish the independence or professionalism of the (Panama Canal) Authority.”

A 1977 treaty laying out the return of the canal from the US to Panama requires the canal to remain neutral and allows for the US to intervene militarily if the waterway’s operations are disrupted by internal conflict or a foreign power.

However, some observers see little or limited sway from China at present.

The US is so firmly established as a the “pre-eminent” partner for Panama that any leverage over goods passing through the canal that China could hope for by enhancing its ties in the country is “capped and limited at best,” according to Brian Wong, a fellow at the University of Hong Kong’s Centre on Contemporary China and the World.

What kind of relationship does China have with Panama?

A 2018 state visit from Chinese leader Xi Jinping to the country of roughly 5 million underscored just how much emphasis Beijing – a major global exporter – has placed on building its ties with the strategically vital country.

Then, the countries inked some 19 agreements to collaborate on trade, infrastructure, banking, and tourism, while Xi declared their relations had “turned over a new chapter.”

That certainly was the case then. China and Panama only established diplomatic ties a year prior, after Panama stopped recognizing Taiwan as the government of China. That same year Panama became the first country in Latin America to join Xi’s flagship Belt and Road global infrastructure development initiative.

Those changes were accompanied by a flurry of bids from Chinese companies to build and invest – projects ranging from a $1 billion container terminal to a high-speed rail. Both those projects ultimately fizzled, as a change in Panama’s leadership brought greater scrutiny over such plans and US concerns drove more caution.

But Chinese firms have also had successes.

A China-built cruise ship terminal was inaugurated last year, while Chinese companies also have a significant presence in special trade zones near Colon and Panama Pacifico, experts say. Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei in 2015 opened a large distribution facility for its electronic systems from one of those zones.

Mulino’s decision not to stay involved in the Belt and Road initiative may signal a new stage of scrutiny on China’s presence in the country. But some observers say Beijing may not be phased.

“China will continue to make investment in Panama if the Central American nation needs the money, and China will continue to trade with Panama,” said Jiang Shixue, director of the Center for Latin American Studies at Shanghai University. Panama’s decision will merely signal to Beijing that “American pressure is so huge,” he added.

Meanwhile, there are signs that while China has an interest in expanding its footprint in the country, it may have other goals, in places with less potential resistance.

“Control of strategic chokepoints like the Panama Canal is probably among China’s goals,” said Will Freeman, Fellow for Latin America studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.

“But it’s dwarfed in importance by a project like Chancay, the new Peruvian mega-port which will accelerate South America-China trade.”

Ukraine’s air force got a boost in its fight against Russia on Thursday with the arrival of Mirage 2000-5 fighter jets from France, along with F-16s from the Netherlands.

French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu confirmed the transfer of the Mirage jets in a post on X, adding the fighters were flown by Ukrainian pilots who have been training for months in France. French President Emmanuel Macron had promised the Mirage jets to Ukraine last summer.

“The Ukrainian sky is becoming more secure!” Defense Minister Rustem Umerov said in a post on Facebook.

Welcoming the arrival of “the first French Mirage 2000 fighter jets and F-16s from the Kingdom of the Netherlands,” Umerov said: “These modern combat aircraft have already arrived in Ukraine and will soon begin carrying out combat missions, strengthening our defense and enhancing our ability to effectively counter Russian aggression.”

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky thanked Macron on Thursday for “his leadership and support.”

“France’s president keeps his word, and we appreciate it,” Zelensky said in a post on X.

The new fighters are expected to boost Ukrainian forces’ ability to provide air cover for troops, attack ground targets, take on enemy planes, and intercept missiles.

The latter role could be vital. Russia has stepped up missile attacks on Ukrainian cities, often sending dozens in one night, taxing Ukraine’s air defense batteries.

Last weekend, a Russian strike on a residential building in central Ukraine killed at least 14 people, emergency services said.

In January, the Ukrainian Air Force reported in a Facebook post that one of its F-16 pilots had destroyed six Russian missiles in one night in December.

Military aviation analyst Peter Layton at the Griffith Asia Institute said the Mirages might be best suited for the air defense role, freeing up the F-16s for other missions.

Mirages can get airborne more quickly than an F-16, Layton said.

“I would have the (Mirages) standing ground alert and able to take off within a few minutes to intercept incoming cruise missiles (primary targets) and Shahed drones (secondary targets),” Layton said.

Mirages could also be used to launch longer-range missiles such as the SCALP, also known as the Storm Shadow, at targets well inside Russia, said Layton, a former Royal Australian Air Force officer.

Ukraine’s air fleet

Ukraine needs all the help it can get in its nearly three-year long war, triggered by Russia’s 2022 invasion of its neighbor.

There has been no let-up in the fighting, even with US President Donald Trump having promised to reach a ceasefire quickly with his return to the White House last month.

Ukraine’s army continues to be pushed back on the eastern front lines, in the face of superior Russian manpower and resources.

Thursday’s announcements did not specify the number of fighter jets transferred from the two NATO allies to Ukraine, but the country has to date had few Western warplanes in its fleet.

Ukraine received its first F-16s last summer, with Zelensky at the time thanking the Netherlands, Denmark and the United States – where the F-16s are built – for the aircraft, without saying how many were delivered.

Reports since indicate two F-16s have been lost. A list of the world’s combat aircraft from Flight Global shows two F-16s in Ukraine’s fleet as of the beginning of this year, with 58 on order.

France had 26 Mirage 2000-5s active in its air force at the beginning of 2025, according to Flight Global. The aircraft are the oldest jets in France’s fleet and are slated to be replaced by Rafale jets in the coming years. It is not known how many will be transferred to Ukraine.

Leighton said current estimates show Ukraine getting a total of 95 F-16s and around two dozen Mirages.

“Neither airframe will be made available to Ukraine in sufficient numbers to provide the air combat capabilities Ukraine needs at this stage in its war with Russia,” he added. “In ideal circumstances, the Ukrainian Air Force should have around 200 – 220 fighter jets at its disposal.”

“How to prepare for a power outage?” reads the Facebook post from the Estonian Rescue Board, the country’s civil defense agency. The picture shows a young woman holding up a power bank, over a table loaded with water bottles, a flashlight and other emergency supplies.

Estonia, along with fellow Baltic states Latvia and Lithuania, is counting down the days to finally ridding itself of one of the last vestiges of 50 years of Soviet occupation: an electricity grid controlled by Russia.

Preparing the population for what most see as the unlikely scenario of power outages is the final stage in a years-long project. “Everything should flow smoothly,” reads the rescue board post, “but unexpected situations can arise… whether that be because of the actions of our hostile neighbor to the East, unexpected weather conditions or technical failures.”

The Baltics have been getting ready for this moment for almost the entire two decades since they joined the EU and NATO in 2004. They’ve renovated existing infrastructure, and built new power lines including several undersea cables to Finland and Sweden and a crucial overland link to the mainland European grid, the LitPol line linking Lithuania and Poland.

That meant that just a few months after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, all three countries were able to stop buying electricity from Moscow.

But Russia was still in total control of the functioning of the grid, balancing supply and demand, and maintaining the frequency, said Susanne Nies, project lead at the German energy research institute Helmholtz-Zentrum. And, in another holdover from Soviet times, it was still providing these services for free.

Six months ago, the Baltic countries officially notified Russia of their intention to “desynchronize” and so, on February 7, the so-called BRELL (Belarus, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) agreement that governs the shared grid will expire.

On February 8, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania will simultaneously disconnect from that grid, at which point they will need to briefly function as an “island,” surviving only on the electricity they produce. On February 9, they plan to synchronize their newly independent grid with the Continental Europe Synchronous Area, which covers most of the European Union.

It’s a highly symbolic moment. Outside the Energy and Technology Museum in the center of Lithuania’s capital, Vilnius, a countdown clock has been ticking down the last 100 days to “energy independence.” “This is the final break from its Soviet-era occupation,” said Jason Moyer, a foreign policy analyst at the Wilson Center, a think tank in Washington. “Psychologically, this is a huge step forward.”

The project has involved significant investment, most of it from the European Union, which has provided grants worth over $1.2bn. But for the Baltics, the price of allowing Moscow to maintain that leverage over their power grid was too high. “We understand fairly well that the cheap Russian energy, it always comes at a price that no democratic European country should be able to afford,” said Päi.

And lest there be any doubt as to their resolve, last year Lithuania’s grid operator Litgrid started cutting old Soviet cables that formed connections to Belarus so the lines could be repurposed.

The question plaguing Baltic leaders now, as some of the most vocal opponents of the war in Ukraine and some of the most generous donors (as a percentage of GDP) to Ukraine’s military, is whether Russia will try to exploit the moment of disconnection, be it through physical sabotage or another hybrid tactic like cyberattacks or disinformation.

Ukraine had in fact disconnected from the Russian grid for a test just hours before Russia launched its full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022. It never reconnected.

Russia has shown itself more than willing to weaponize electricity supply, not only through repeated attacks on the Ukrainian energy grid, but also through its almost three-year occupation of the Zaporizhzia nuclear plant, which before the war provided about a fifth of Ukraine’s electricity.

For Russia, the loss of leverage over the Baltics, former Soviet vassals, is a geopolitical defeat, said Moyer, adding: “I think this really shows that Russia is losing influence in the region,” one that was “traditionally more receptive to Russian business.” The Kremlin declined to comment, noting only that Russia had taken all necessary measures to ensure the “uninterrupted and reliable operation of our unified energy system.”

“We are increasing our surveillance efforts, we are increasing our additional security measures, and… we are going to watch this with an eye of a hawk,” Šakalienė said.

NATO has now set up a new mission to protect undersea cables in the Baltic Sea, after the Estlink 2, a critical part of the Baltics’ post-Soviet electricity infrastructure, was damaged on Christmas Day, the latest in a series of incidents involving disruption to the complex web of cables criss-crossing the Baltic Sea floor.

Grid operators in Finland and the Baltic states assured customers in the days afterward that supplies were secured. But electricity prices did tick up in late December, and the repairs, according to Finnish authorities, will take until August.

Finland is still investigating the incident, but police have detained a ship carrying Russian oil products, suspected of dragging its anchor across the cable. A lawyer representing the owner of the ship last week called any allegation of sabotage “nonsense.”

One area neither NATO nor the Baltics can police is Kaliningrad. The tiny Russian exclave sandwiched between Lithuania and Poland will now have to function as an electricity “island,” and while Russia has carried out multiple successful tests of its ability to cope, experts are not ruling out deliberate action by Moscow to stir up tensions.

“Russia might even provoke a fake blackout in the region and say ‘Hey, Kaliningrad, this is even the result of the Baltic synchronization,’” said Nies. She believes Russia could then accuse the Baltics of plunging the one million residents of Kaliningrad into darkness and use that to exact concessions, and assess NATO’s appetite to come to the aid of its eastern flank.

The risk may be higher now, with a new administration in Washington that is critical of NATO and determined to end the war in Ukraine. “(The Russians) want to see if NATO is alive, and where do you test it other than in the Baltics?” said Nies.